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Defendant

Fields, convicted for statutory burglary and escape, had counsel appointed ten to fiteen minutes before trial commenced. He thereafter
waived arraignment, tendered a plea of guilty to both counts, and sentence was entered accordingly.' In a companion case, defendant Yates,
convicted for statutory burglary, had counsel appointed the day on
which he was indicted. Counsel conferred with Yates twenty to thirty
minutes on that day, after which a plea of not guilty was entered. He
conferred with him once again, for about thirty minutes, on the day
of trial. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia dismissed, inter
alia, petitioners' contention on habeas corpus that as a result of insufficient time allowed or actually used by their counsel for consulta-

non and preparation of defenses, they were deprived of due process
of law.
In arriving at its decision, the Court was not unmindful of federal
precedents3 nor Virginia's own applicable precedent, Morris v. Smyth. 4
However, in deciding the present cases being reviewed, the Court
emphatically restated the well-settled rule that to prove deprivation of
constitutional rights, the petitioner must so prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.5 In the Morris case, inadequate assistance of
counsel was grossly apparent. Counsel conferred with Smyth "about
10 minutes," failed to summon a vital witness at defendant's request,

'and took no part in the proceedings, however, no answer was filed by
the warden to the petition and the petition was dismissed without a
hearing, the Court following the rule that where allegations of a
1. Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147 S.E. 2d 762, 766 (1966). The Supreme Court of
Appeals found that Fields knew of no witnesses that could have been called, nor did
he present any defenses which could have been presented at the trial on his behalf.
2. Yates v. Peyton, 207 Va. 91, 147 S.E. 2d 767, 772-773 (1966). The Supreme Court
of Appeals found that Yates failed to show that time was insufficient for the attorney
to prepare an adequate defense, and, although counsel failed to call Yates' co-defendant
as a witness, as requested (the attorney maintained that an interview with this codefendant showed that it was not in petitioner's best interest to elicit this testimony),
petitioner still did not show that he was prejudiced in any way as a result of such
inaction.
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 LEd. 158 (1932) made applicable
in the present factual situation through Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct.
792 (1963).
4. 202 Va. 832, 120 S.E.2d 465 (1961).
5. Peyton v. Fields, supra note 1, at 766.
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petitioner are not denied, they must be accepted as true.' Thus Morris
proved his deprivation of effective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in the instant cases, the petitions
of both prisoners were answered by the warden and plenary hearings
were held on the allegations. Here the warden refuted petitioners'
allegations and the Court held that the prisoners failed to carry their
7
burden of proof.
The question of court-appointed counsel having a sufficient amount
of time for preparation is decided in one of two ways: (1) legislative
determination of a time period in which counsel must have for his
preparation. 8 (2) The view taken by the majority, and which Virginia adopts, requiring that the court look at each case on its own
factual basis to determine whether counsel had reasonable time in
which to prepare for trial. It would seem from a survey of the cases
that the petitioner has a much better chance of proving a denial of
constitutional rights if it should happen that counsel's motions for a
continuance are dismissed.'0 The Supreme Court of Appeals in the
present cases, likewise placed much weight on the fact that neither had
requested a continuance, and also on counsel's contention during the
plenary hearings that they had adequate time for preparation."
The present cases reflect the majority rules in determination as to
alleged denial of 'effective counsel, but Justice Sneed probably ex6. Morris v. Smith, supra note 3, at 833.
7. Peyton v. Fields, supra note 1; Yates v. Peyton, supra note 2, at 773.
8. See, e.g., California Codes, section 1049 (1872) (Penal Code) (After his plea, the
defendant is entitled to at least five days to prepare for trial).
Texas Statutes Annotated, Art. 26.04(b) (1965) (Code of Criminal Procedure) (The
appointed counsel is entitled to ten days to prepare for trial, but may waive the time
by written notice, signed by the counsel and the accused.)
9. E.g., United States v. Ray, 351 F.2d 554, 555 (4th Cir., 1965); Johnson v. State,
372 S.W.2d 192, 194 (1963); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); Reynolds v.
Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1960); Lorenz v. People,-Colo.-, 412 P.2d 895 (1966); Re
Newbern 53 Cal. 2d 786, 3 Cal. Rpter. 364, 350 P.2d 116 (1960).
10. E.g., French v. State, 161 So.2d 879 (Fla. App. 1964); People v. Shiffman, 350
Ill. 243, 182 N.E. 760 (1932); Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777, 79 SE. 1128 (1913); Stone
v. Collins, 104 La. 629, 29 So. 180 (1900); Johnson v. State, supra note 8; Reynolds v.
Cochran, s-upra, note 8; Lorenz v. People, supra, note 8. But see, Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444, 446, 84 LEd. 377, 60 S.Ct. 321, where Justice Black vigorously asserted
that "Since the Constitution nowhere specifies any period which must intervene
between the required appointment of counsel and trial, the fact, standing alone, that
a continuance had been denied, does not constitute a denial of the constitutional right
to assistance of counsel."
11. Peyton v. Fields, supra note 1, at 765; Yaes v. Peyton, supra note 2, at 769.
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presses an underlying motive when he states in Peyton v. Fields, "He
made the customary and often abused claim for relief, i.e., that he was
denied due process of law because he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel by his court-appointed counsel.." 12 However, the
rules used by the Court in the instant cases are logical and, indeed,
provide substantial justice. Based on the totality of the circumstances
of the defendants' cases, the law should not require the useless formality of extended preparation when the defendant cannot show that
the fruits of such preparation would be increased.
Thomas C. Clark
Armed

Services-SOLDIERS AND SAILORS CIVIL RELIEF AcT-IMMu-

NITY OF NON-RESIDENT SERVICEMAN FROM STATE AUTOMOBILE "Li-

CENSE FEE." A serviceman residing in a state solely because of military
or naval orders is accorded broad immunity from local tax measures,
under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.' In California v.
Buzard2 the defendant soldier, claiming immunity under the Act, contested the state requirement that he pay a "license fee" of two percent
of the market value of his automobile as a prerequisite to registration.'
Buzard, a Washington domiciliary, had paid no fees upon his car to
12. Peyton v. Fields, supra note 1, at 763.
1. § 514, 56 Stat. 769, 777 (1942), 58 Stat. 722 (1944), 76 Stat. 768 (1962), 50 U.S.C.A.
App. § 574 states:
"(1) For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of his personal
property, income, or gross income, by any State, Territory, possession, or political
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or by the District of Columbia, such person shall not be deemed to have lost a residence or domicile in any State .. .
solely by reason of being absent therefrom in compliance with military or naval
orders, or to have acquired a residence or domicile in, or to have become resident in or a resident of any State . .. while, and solely by reason of being,
so absent. For the purposes of taxation in respect of the personal property, income, or gross income of any such person by any State . . . of which such

person is not a resident or in which he is not domiciled . ..personal property
shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation
in such State....
"(2) When used in this section, (a) the term 'personal property' shall include
tangible and intangible property (including motor vehicles), and (b) the term
'taxation' shall include but not be limited to licenses, fees or excises imposed in
respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof: Provided, That the license, fee, or
excise required by the State, Territory, possession, or District of Columbia of
which the person is a resident or in which he is domiciled has been paid."
The legislation shall hereinafter be called "the Act."
2. 382 U.S. 386 (1966).
3. CALIFORNIA REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE, §§ 10751, 10752. (Although the "license
fee" was held to be an excise on the privilege of using public highways, rather than

